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ABSTRACT
U.S. financial regulators are considering exempting foreign
government obligations from the Volcker Rule’s prohibition on
proprietary trading. Bank Holding Company Act § 13(d)(1)(J),
added by Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, governs such exemptions and sets a very
high standard for regulators seeking to utilize them. This provision
requires that four regulatory agencies unanimously agree to the
exemption and determine that it satisfies a strict substantive
standard—that it “promote[s] and protect[s] the safety and soundness
of the banking entity and the financial stability of the United
1
States.”
Regulators may jointly agree to make such an exemption for
sovereign debt because they are facing intense political pressure to
do so. Foreign governments, including several close allies of the
United States, have spoken out publicly against the Volcker Rule.
These governments are asking U.S. regulators to exempt sovereign
debt from the trading prohibitions of the Volcker Rule because of the
adverse effects it will have on their debt markets. Their concerns
support the case that the substantive standard in § 13(d)(1)(J) is
satisfied.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Volcker Rule in § 619 of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).2
The Volcker Rule prohibits proprietary trading by federally-insured
depository institutions and sets capital and quantitative limits on
proprietary trading by nonbank financial companies supervised by the
Federal Reserve Board.3 It also contains limited exceptions to the ban
on proprietary trading, permitting trading in government securities,
trading in connection with market-making activities, and trading on
behalf of customers.4 Importantly, Congress did not include foreign

2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1617–32 (2010). The Volcker Rule is set out in section
13 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2006).
3. Id.
4. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(A)–(D). The Volcker Rule also permits certain
risk-mitigating hedging. See id. § 1851(d)(1)(C).

2013]

FOREIGN DEBT AND THE VOLCKER RULE

671

government obligations in the government securities exemption.5 As a
result, U.S. banks may not proprietarily trade in foreign sovereign debt.
Foreign governments, worried that the rule will restrict their ability to
raise capital in public markets, are asking regulators to make an
exception for sovereign debt. One possible avenue for creating this
exception is a provision within the Volcker Rule allowing regulators to
exempt additional activities from the prohibition on proprietary trading,
if the activities meet certain requirements.6
Congress granted regulators the authority to exempt activities from
the Volcker Rule in subsection 13(d)(1)(J) of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956.7 In order for regulators—the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”), Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (“OCC”), and Federal Reserve Board (collectively, the
“Agencies”)—to exempt an activity, they must first agree on what
activity to exempt.8 Further, that activity must be one that “would
promote and protect the safety and soundness of the banking entity and
the financial stability of the United States.”9 Many foreign governments
have submitted public comment letters asking the Agencies to exercise
their authority under § 13(d)(1)(J) to exempt foreign government
obligations. The statute itself does not explicitly say when the Agencies
should use their exemptive power, nor does it distinguish between
banned and permitted activities. As a result, the Agencies face the
5. Congress did however, exempt U.S. federal and state obligations. See id. §
1851(d)(1)(A).
6. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(J).
7. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(J), 124 Stat. 1376,
1626.
8. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(J). Section 13(d)(1)(J) applies to “banking entities,”
which is defined in § 13(h)(1) as “any insured depository institution, any company that
controls an insured depository institution, or that is treated as a bank holding company
for purposes of section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978, and any affiliate or
subsidiary of any such entity.” The term “appropriate Federal banking agencies” is
defined in section 3(q) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (the “FDIC Act”). DoddFrank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 2(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1387. The FDIC Act states
that, in the case of any bank holding company and any subsidiary (other than a
depository institution) of a bank holding company, the appropriate Federal banking
agency means the OCC and the Federal Reserve Board. 12 U.S.C. 1813(q). Thus, the
“appropriate federal banking agencies” for a majority of “banking entities” under
§ 13(d)(1)(J) are the OCC and the Federal Reserve Board, as well as the CFTC and
SEC, which are explicitly mentioned in the provision.
9. Id.
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difficult task of writing rules that fill these voids. The Agencies are now
struggling to determine if Congress really intended to include foreign
government obligations in the ban on proprietary trading.
In October 2011, the Agencies released Prohibitions and
Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds (“Proposed
Rule”), containing proposed regulations for implementing the Volcker
Rule.10 The Proposed Rule seeks comments on certain questions,
including whether the § 13(d)(1)(J) exemptive authority should be
applied to foreign government obligations.11
This article analyzes the substantive and procedural hurdles of §
13(d)(1)(J) in light of the Proposed Rule’s legislative history, similar
exemptive provisions in other Acts, and the ways that the Agencies have
applied the section thus far. It then considers whether the Agencies will
exercise their ability to exempt foreign government obligations under §
13(d)(1)(J), and how the Agencies are likely to exercise it in the future.
Section I outlines the legislative history of § 13(d)(1)(J). Section II
compares the text of § 13(d)(1)(J) with exemptive provisions in other
statutes to determine the strictness of the exemption standard. Section
III discusses how regulators propose to implement the exemptive
authority in § 13(d)(1)(J), analyzes the arguments for and against
creating an exemption for sovereign debt, and contains suggestions as to
how the Agencies should determine future exemptions.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Though there is limited legislative history for § 13(d)(1)(J),
congressional intent can be gleaned from the changes Congress made in
amendments to the proposed bill. The next section explains the standard
10. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in,
and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846
(Nov. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 44, 12 C.F.R. pt. 248, 12 C.F.R. pt. 351,
and 17 C.F.R. pt. 255) [hereinafter Proposed Rule].
11. The question reads:
Question 122. Should the Agencies adopt an additional exemption for proprietary
trading in the obligations of foreign governments and/or international and
multinational development banks under section 13(d)(1)(J) of the BHC Act? If so,
what types of obligations should be exempt? How would such an exemption promote
and protect the safety and soundness of banking entities and the financial stability of
the United States?

Id. at 68,878.
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that Agencies must meet when exercising § 13(d)(1)(J), then examines
important changes made to § 13(d)(1)(J) during the legislative process.
A. FRAMEWORK OF THE FINAL ENACTED VERSION OF § 13(d)(1)(J)
The final version of § 13(d)(1)(J) details the types of activities that
can be exempted under the Volcker Rule. These activities include:
(J) Such other activity as the appropriate Federal banking agencies,
the SEC, and the CFTC determine, by rule, as provided in subsection
(b)(2), would promote and protect the safety and soundness of the
12
banking entity and the financial stability of the United States.

This language presents three requirements that the proposed activity
must satisfy before regulators are able to exempt it. First, the statute
requires unanimity; all of the regulators must agree on the activity to be
exempted.13 This gives each regulator de facto veto power over all §
13(d)(1)(J) determinations. Second, the activity must be one that
promotes and protects the banking entity. The second prong thus
requires the Agencies to make a factual determination as to whether the
activity supports or fosters the health of those institutions taking part in
it. Finally, the activity must be one that promotes and protects the
financial stability of the U.S. On a macro scale, the third prong suggests
that regulators must take into account the cumulative effect of all
institutions that may change their behavior as a result of the exemption.
To get a better understanding of the substantive standards in §
13(d)(1)(J), it is worthwhile to examine the changes Congress made
before enacting it.
B. CHANGES AND AMENDMENTS TO DRAFT LANGUAGE
Original versions of the Dodd-Frank legislation did not provide
regulators with authority to exempt additional activities from the
Volcker Rule’s ban on proprietary trading. The text of amendments on
May 10, 2010 added the provision that first granted exemptive authority.
It permitted exemptions for:

12.
13.

12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(J).
In addition, the Secretary of the Treasury, as Chairperson of the Financial
Stability Oversight Council, is responsible for coordinating the Agencies’ rulemakings
under Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(2)(B)(ii).
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(I) Such other activity as the appropriate Federal banking agencies,
in consultation with the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, jointly determine
through regulation, as provided for in subsection (c), would promote
and protect the safety and soundness of the banking entity or
nonbank financial company and the financial stability of the United
14
States.

On May 19, 2010, that language was removed and replaced with
the following provision:
“(J) Such other activity as the appropriate Federal banking agencies,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission determine through regulation, as
provided in subsection (b)(2)(B), would promote and protect the
safety and soundness of the banking entity or nonbank financial
company supervised by the Board and the financial stability of the
15
United States.”

The second draft required all four regulators to jointly decide on the
regulation, whereas the first only required the appropriate Federal
banking agencies to consult with the SEC and CFTC before making a
determination. The revised version effectively established more
powerful roles for the SEC and CFTC in the exemption process. The
change suggests that Congress did not want to grant the exemptive
power to a small number of Federal banking agencies.
A second difference in the first two proposed drafts of the
exemptive authority is related to the process that regulators must follow
to make their determination. In the first draft, regulators were directed
to subsection (c), which instructed them to use the rulemaking authority
in (b)(2).16 In contrast, the second draft mandated that regulators use the
rulemaking process in (b)(2)(B).17 This change effectively eliminated
(b)(2)(A) from the determination process.18 As a result, the regulators
14. 156 CONG. REC. S3482-83 (daily ed. May 10, 2010) (text of
Merkley‘s proposed amendment).
15. 156 CONG. REC. S3988 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (text of Sen. Jeff
proposed amendment).
16. 156 CONG. REC. S3482-83 (daily ed. May 10, 2010) (text of
Merkley’s proposed amendment).
17. 156 CONG. REC. S3988 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (text of Sen. Jeff
proposed amendment).
18. Subsection (b)(2)(A) originally read:

Sen. Jeff
Merkley’s
Sen. Jeff
Merkley’s
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would no longer need to consider the results of a Financial Stability
Oversight Council study before deciding to exempt an activity.
The next (and final) version of the exemptive authority made two
more changes. The final draft reads:
(J) Such other activity as the appropriate Federal banking agencies,
the SEC, and the CFTC determine, by rule, as provided in subsection
(b)(2), would promote and protect the safety and soundness of the
19
banking entity and the financial stability of the United States.

In this version, Congress directed the regulators to make determinations
by rule rather than regulation. Congress also removed the words “or
nonbank financial company supervised by the Board.” These changes
are relatively insignificant. What is important is that Congress kept the
requirement that all four regulators must agree to the exemption.
C. RELEVANT REMARKS DURING CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE
The substantive requirement for exempting activities from the
Volcker Rule in § 13(d)(1)(J) is vague, only stating that an exemption
must “promote and protect the safety and soundness of the banking
entity and the financial stability of the United States.”20 It does not say
when Congress would condone an exemption, but due diligence
discussion on the floor of the legislature sheds a bit of light on this
ambiguity. The legislators’ only explicit reference to § 13(d)(1)(J) in
the official record is a remark by Senator Jeff Merkley on July 15, 2010.
Senator Merkley stated:

(A) IN GENERAL—Not later than 9 months after the completion of the study under
paragraph (1), the appropriate Federal banking agencies, in consultation with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, (unless otherwise provided in this section) shall consider the findings of
the study under paragraph (1) and adopt rules to carry out this section.

156 CONG. REC. S3482 (daily ed. May 10, 2010) (Sen. Jeff Merkley
submitting amendment).
That section of the draft was later changed to:
(A) In general—Unless otherwise provided in this section, not later than 9 months
after the completion of the study under paragraph (1), the appropriate Federal banking
agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, shall consider the findings of the study under paragraph (1) and
adopt rules to carry out this section, as provided in subparagraph (B).

12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(2)(A).
19. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(J).
20. Id.
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Subparagraph (J) permits the regulators to add additional exceptions
as necessary to ‘promote and protect the safety and soundness of the
banking entity and the financial stability of the United States.’ This
general exception power is intended to ensure that some unforeseen,
low-risk activity is not inadvertently swept in by the prohibition on
proprietary trading. However, the subparagraph sets an extremely
high bar: the activity must be necessary to promote and protect the
safety and soundness of the banking entity and the financial stability
of the United States, and not simply pose a competitive disadvantage
21
or a threat to firms’ profitability.

Senator Ted Kaufman “urge[d] the regulators to construe narrowly
those activities that constitute exceptions to proprietary trading to ensure
that the Volcker Rule has some teeth in it.”22 While discussing the
Merkley-Levin amendment, Kaufman went on to endorse the Volcker
Rule because “[i]t would not give unnecessary discretion to the same
regulators who have long had the authority to prohibit speculative
activities at banks but never opted to do so.”23
From these remarks, it appears that Congress intended § 13(d)(1)(J)
to be used primarily to exempt low-risk activity that had been
inadvertently incorporated into the Volcker Rule. This objective makes
sense, as it provides regulators with a quick and easy way to exempt
clear-cut cases of harmless activity.
If Congress intended for
§ 13(d)(1)(J) to operate as a mechanism for regulators to prevent
beneficial, low-risk activities from accidentally coming under the
Volcker Rule’s prohibition on proprietary trading, then clearly
foreseeable activities, such as trading foreign government obligations,
should not be exempted at all.
II. COMPARING § 13(d)(1)(J) TO EXEMPTIVE PROVISIONS IN OTHER
STATUTES
An examination of other exemptive provisions provides an
interesting contrast to the above discussion. Both the Exchange Act of
1934 and the Commodities Exchange Act contain such provisions, but
21. 156 CONG. REC. S5897 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jeff
Merkley).
22. 156 CONG. REC. S5886 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Ted
Kaufman).
23. 156 CONG. REC. S3889 (daily ed. May 18, 2010) (statement of Sen. Ted
Kaufman).
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they operate very differently from § 13(d)(1)(J) in that they authorize
exemptions in less extreme circumstances.
A. EXEMPTIVE AUTHORITY IN THE EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Congress gave broad exemptive discretion to the “Commission in
the Exchange Act. The exemptive provision in the Exchange Act
authorizes the Commission to “exempt any person or class of persons or
any transaction or class of transactions, either conditionally or upon
specified terms and conditions or for stated periods . . . .”24 In addition,
the Commission may make exemptions “by rule, regulation, or
order[.]”25
Under this provision, the Commission can exempt a wide range of
entities such as people, securities, or transactions and can issue such
exemptions in multiple ways including by rule, regulation, or order. The
Commission’s exemptive power under the Exchange Act is further
expanded because it has the authority to make exemptions of varying
degrees. By contrast, § 13(d)(1)(J) of the Volcker Rule requires
unanimous agreement among five regulators, as well as fulfillment of a
demanding substantive standard.26
B. EXEMPTIVE AUTHORITY IN THE COMMODITIES EXCHANGE ACT
Likewise, the exemptive provision in the Commodities Exchange
Act (“CEA”) is much less demanding than § 13(d)(1)(J). The CEA’s
exemptive provision, enacted by the same Congress that enacted the
Volcker Rule, contains a provision allowing the Treasury to exempt
certain derivatives from the CEA’s prohibitions. Under that provision,
the Secretary of the Treasury ( the “Secretary”) may “exempt foreign
exchange swaps and foreign exchange forwards from the definition of
the term ‘swap’ . . . .”27 In making the exemptive determination, the
Secretary is directed by statute to consider various factors before
rendering a final determination.28 After making a decision to exempt a

24. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(h)(6).
25. Id.
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(J).
27. 7 U.S.C. § 1b(b).
28. The statute reads:
(a) Required considerations
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foreign exchange swap or forward, the Secretary must explain its
determination to Congress.29 It must justify why those swaps or
forwards are qualitatively different and ill-suited for regulation as
swaps, as well as the objective differences between those swaps or
forwards and standard swaps that are exempt.30
Conspicuously, Congress did not give the Treasury an explicit
standard to meet when exempting an instrument. None of the various
considerations Congress sets out are determinative; they are merely
guideposts to aid regulators. Thus, the provision confers relatively
unconstrained decision making authority upon the Treasury. Most
importantly, and unlike § 13(d)(1)(J), the Treasury does not have to
work in conjunction with any other agency.

In determining whether to exempt foreign exchange swaps and foreign exchange
forwards from the definition of the term “swap”, the Secretary of the Treasury
(referred to in this section as the “Secretary”) shall consider—
(1) whether the required trading and clearing of foreign exchange swaps and foreign
exchange forwards would create systemic risk, lower transparency, or threaten the
financial stability of the U.S.;
(2) whether foreign exchange swaps and foreign exchange forwards are already
subject to a regulatory scheme that is materially comparable to that established by this
chapter for other classes of swaps;
(3) the extent to which bank regulators of participants in the foreign exchange market
provide adequate supervision, including capital and margin requirements;
(4) the extent of adequate payment and settlement systems; and
(5) the use of a potential exemption of foreign exchange swaps and foreign exchange
forwards to evade otherwise applicable regulatory requirements.

7 U.S.C. § 1b(a)(1)–(5).
29. 7 U.S.C. § 1b(b).
30. The statute reads:
(b) Determination
If the Secretary makes a determination to exempt foreign exchange swaps and foreign
exchange forwards from the definition of the term “swap”, the Secretary shall submit
to the appropriate committees of Congress a determination that contains—
(1) an explanation regarding why foreign exchange swaps and foreign exchange
forwards are qualitatively different from other classes of swaps in a way that
would make the foreign exchange swaps and foreign exchange forwards ill-suited
for regulation as swaps; and
(2) an identification of the objective differences of foreign exchange swaps and
foreign exchange forwards with respect to standard swaps that warrant an
exempted status.

7 U.S.C. § 1b(b)(1)–(2).
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C. THE STANDARD IN § 13(d)(1)(J) IS A VERY TOUGH HURDLE TO
OVERCOME
Due to both Congress’ demanding substantive standard and its
requirement that all four regulators agree to exemptions, the Agencies’
power to exercise exemptions under the Volcker Rule is severely
limited. Additionally, in contrast to similar exemptive provisions
drafted by Congress in the past, such as the Securities Exchange Act and
the concurrent Amendment to the Commodities Exchange Act,31 the text
of § 13(d)(1)(J) does not offer the Agencies much discretionary
authority to make exemptions. As a result, the Volcker Rule has the
potential to be inflexible and inadaptable, and may prohibit activities
that do not threaten U.S. financial stability.32
The incredible procedural hurdle that Congress placed upon the
Agencies cannot be overemphasized. Consider the requirement that all
four regulators must agree to an exemption. The likelihood of all of the
Agencies’ interests aligning at once is slim and would certainly require
extraordinary political or economic circumstances. Given this burden, it
appears that § 13(d)(1)(J) will be invoked rarely, and only in unexpected
circumstances. The havoc that the Volcker Rule could potentially cause
to foreign debt markets is unlikely to qualify as an unforeseeable
circumstance under § 13(d)(1)(J). Nevertheless, the Agencies are
proposing to use § 13(d)(1)(J) authority to make certain exemptions to
rule proposals implementing the Volcker Rule, and have inquired about
using the authority to exempt foreign government obligations.33
III. ANALYZING AN EXEMPTION FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
OBLIGATIONS
A. HOW THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS TREAT THE § 13(d)(1)(J)
EXEMPTIVE AUTHORITY
An examination of the Agencies’ proposed exemptions provides
context for how the Agencies might analyze Volcker Rule exemptions in
the future. In the Proposed Rule, the Agencies requested comment on
31.
32.

See supra Part II.B.C.
Under subsection 13(d)(1)(J), regulators can exempt activities that “promote
and protect” the banking entity and U.S. financial stability. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(J).
Interestingly, this seems to indicate that the exemption would not extend to activities
that are neutral to either the banking entity or U.S. financial stability.
33. See generally Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846 (Nov. 7, 2011).
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whether and how to implement § 13(d)(1)(J) exemptions in twenty
separate questions.34 When the Agencies analyze § 13(d)(1)(J) decisions
in the Proposed Rule, they use an assortment of unrelated factors that
they apply differently in each situation.35 Thus, for each exemption, the
application of § 13(d)(1)(J) depends on its own particular facts, factors,
and analysis that are unrelated to other exemptions. The Agencies
suggest exercising their exemptive power to permit three activities under
§ 13(d)(1)(J) of the Proposed Rule.
Initially, the Agencies proposed to exempt bank-owned life
insurance investments because they do not involve speculative risks and
they reduce banking entities’ cost of providing employee benefits.36
Allowing banks to manage and structure their risks and obligations
regarding employee benefit plans, the Agencies state, “promotes and
protects” the soundness of banking entities, and “on an industry-wide
level has the concomitant effect of promoting and protecting the
financial stability of the United States.”37
The Proposed Rule would also exercise § 13(d)(1)(J) authority to
exempt activities relating to loan securitization. It proposes the
exclusion of certain entities from the definition of a “covered fund”—a
company that a banking entity may not sponsor or own under the
Volcker Rule.38 The Agencies state that Congress did not intend to
restrict bank dealings with these entities because they “do not engage in
the type and scope of activities to which Congress intended [the Volcker
Rule] to apply.”39 Central to that conclusion is the language in §
13(g)(2), which contains a rule of construction mandating this outcome:
“Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or restrict the ability
of a banking entity . . . to sell or securitize loans in a manner otherwise
permitted by law.”40 In light of this directive, an exemption for certain
34. Id. The twenty questions referring to § 13(d)(1)(J) are scattered throughout the
Proposed Rule.
35. See infra notes 36–50 and accompanying text.
36. Id. at 68,913.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 68,853. Specifically, the Agencies would allow a banking entity to
acquire an ownership interest in a joint venture, an acquisition vehicle used to effect an
acquisition or merger with the banking entity, and a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
banking entity that engages principally in bona fide liquidity management services and
is carried on the balance sheet of the banking entity. Id. at 68,913.
39. Id. at 68,913.
40. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(g)(2) (2006).
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asset-backed securitization vehicles makes sense because they seem like
just the type of low-risk activity that Congress did not want to include in
the Volcker Rule.
The Agencies offer an assortment of additional separate factors
supporting the loan securitization exemption. First, denying the
exemption would cause many entities “to alter their corporate structure
without achieving any reduction in risk.”41 Thus, for example, the
Proposed Rule would use § 13(d)(1)(J) authority to allow a banking
entity to obtain a limited ownership interest in an issuer of asset-backed
securities.42 This exemption would permit banking entities to take on
some of the risk of the asset-backed securities they are helping to issue.
In addition, the Agencies state that retaining a minimum level of
economic interest “will incent banking entities to engage in more careful
and prudent underwriting and evaluation of the risks and obligations that
may accompany asset-backed securitizations, which would promote and
protect the safety and soundness of banking entities and the financial
stability of the United States.”43
The Agencies further muddle the exemption analysis by permitting
banking entities “to acquire or retain an ownership interest in” loan
securitizations.44 The Proposed Rule states that this exemption will
promote and protect a banking entity’s safety and soundness as well as
the financial stability of the U.S. because it will broaden the pool of
potential participants in the sale of securitizations.45 The Agencies
argue that this exemption is warranted because it makes it easier for
banks to diversify their holdings and for individuals and small
businesses to raise capital.46 Section 13(g)(2) is likely driving the result
in this exemption as it prohibits any interpretation that would limit a
bank’s ability to sell or securitize loans.47
Finally, the Agencies seek to use § 13(d)(1)(J) to exempt bank
sponsorship of a Small Business Investment Company, a public welfare
investment, or a certain qualified rehabilitation expenditure.48
Influencing this decision is § 13(d)(1)(E) that allows, as a permitted
activity, “investments designed primarily to promote the public
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,912.
Id. at 68,854.
Id. at 68,914.
Id. at 68,853.
Id. at 68,914.
Id.
12 U.S.C. § 1851(g)(2) (2006).
Id. at 68,908 n.296.
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welfare.”49 The Agencies argue that this meets the strict substantive
standard in § 13(d)(1)(J) because it promotes and protects the safety and
soundness of banking entities as well as the financial stability of the
United States by “facilitat[ing] investment in small business and
support[ing] the public welfare.”50
In sum, there is no evidence that any exercise of §13(d)(1)(J)
authority is related to any other. The results are driven by provisions
elsewhere in Dodd-Frank or are geared towards tying up loose ends left
by hurried drafting of the legislation. In some circumstances the
Agencies are concerned with enabling banking entities to manage and
structure their costs and risks; in others, their focus is on increasing the
availability of capital to individuals and small businesses. At the same
time, they have justified exemptions as necessary to ensure careful and
prudent underwriting practices. The application of § 13(d)(1)(J)
therefore depends on its own facts, factors, and analysis that are
independent of other exemptions. Since there is no clear framework for
making § 13(d)(1)(J) exemptions, the Agencies are free to consider any
factors they deem appropriate.
B. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXEMPTING FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
OBLIGATIONS
The Agencies apply the Proposed Rule to exempt activities that
Congress overlooked when drafting the Volcker Rule or where there is
an explicit provision driving the result.51 Neither of these justifications
applies to the sovereign debt exemption; however, public comment
letters provide persuasive justifications for an exemption. These
comment letters, many submitted by close U.S. allies, primarily discuss
the unintended adverse economic effects that the Volcker Rule would
have on their debt markets.52 As a result, policymakers are under
49.
50.
51.
52.

12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(E).
See Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,908 n.292.
See supra notes 36–50 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Letter from the Fin. Servs. Agency, Gov’t of Japan, and Bank of
Japan, to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, and Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Dec. 28, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-78.pdf., Letter from the
Fin. Indus. Council of Austl., to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n 2 (Feb. 15, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-
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immense political pressure to implement an exemption.53 The comment
letters only focus tangentially on the substantive standard in §
13(d)(1)(J). Rather than argue why an exemption would promote
financial stability in the U.S., they emphasize the detrimental impact
that the rule will have on their economies.54
Without an exemption, foreign governments warn that the current
rule will reduce trading and liquidity in sovereign debt markets. For
example, Canadian Finance Minister James Flaherty stated that the
Proposed Rule “could severely impact the liquidity of Canadian
government debt markets and interfere with the risk management
practices of banks in Canada.”55 Although the Volcker Rule contains
exceptions for market-making and hedging, the absence of an explicit
exemption for sovereign debt will make trading in sovereign bonds a
less attractive and profitable endeavor.56 Banks subject to the Volcker
Rule that wish to trade in foreign government securities under the
market-making exception would have to build extensive compliance
systems to prove that they were trading within the permitted marketmaking definition.57 The ban on proprietary trading, combined with this
11/s74111-345.pdf; Letter from Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Canada, to Dr. Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 2–3 (Feb. 13, 2012),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-211.pdf; and Letter from
George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Second Lord of the Treasury of the
United Kingdom to Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. Of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys. 1 (January 23, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s7411192.pdf.
53. The Agencies have contributed to this pressure by seeking public comment on
§ 13(d)(1)(J) authority, and suggesting that § 13(d)(1)(J) might be applied to foreign
government obligations. See id. at 68,878.
54. Id.
55. Letter from James M. Flaherty, Canadian Minister of Finance, to Timothy
Geithner, Sec’y of the Treasury 1 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-212.pdf.
56. See Letter from the Fin. Servs. Agency, Gov’t of Japan, and Bank of Japan, to
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, and Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Dec. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-78.pdf.
57. See Examining the Impact of the Volcker Rule on Markets, Businesses,
Investors and Job Creation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer
Credit, Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters., H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 112th Cong. 9–10 (2012) [hereinafter Hearing on the Impact of the Volcker
Rule] (testimony of Mark Standish, Pres. & Co-CEO, RBC Capital Markets) (testifying
on behalf of the Inst. of Int’l Bankers), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/
UploadedFiles/HHRG-112-BA-WState-MStandish-20120118.pdf.
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costly regulatory compliance program, will reduce liquidity and affect
prices in the sovereign debt market.58 The Finance Industry Council of
Australia (“FICA”) wrote that “the Proposed Rules would have a
substantial detrimental impact . . . .” FICA cites concern about the
possibility of “a number of adverse consequences, including increased
sovereign funding costs . . . reduced liquidity . . . [and] inhibitions on the
development of mutual funds and similar types of savings and
investment vehicles outside of the U.S.”59 The Australia Bankers
Association has stated that without the unhindered ability to trade in this
debt, the liquidity of the Australian Government bond market will be
undermined.60 Representatives from both Germany and Japan have
echoed these sentiments.61 They concluded that decreased trading will
reduce the value of sovereign debt and make it more difficult for
governments to obtain adequate financing.62
These governments cited another crucial consequence of the
Volcker Rule; not only will U.S. banks be precluded from proprietary
trading in sovereign debt, but foreign banks are precluded from trading
their own domestic government debt if they have a sufficient U.S.
nexus.63 Withdrawal of banks from these markets would eliminate a
58.
59.

Id. at 10–12.
Letter from the Fin. Indus. Council of Austl., to Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and
Sec.
&
Exch.
Comm’n
2
(Feb.
15,
2012),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-345.pdf.
60. Letter from the Australian Bankers Ass’n, to Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, and Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 5 (Feb. 13, 2012),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-329.pdf.
61. See generally Hearing on the Impact of the Volcker Rule, supra note 53; see
also Letter from the Fin. Servs. Agency, Gov’t of Japan, and Bank of Japan, to Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, and Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 52, at 2; see also Letter from
Ass’n of German Banks, to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 7
(Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-157.pdf.
62. Id.
63. The Association of German Banks writes:
Thus, even if trading in EU member states’ government bonds by European and
German banks may, in theory, be eligible under one of these exemptions, the
extraterritorial application of their requirements may strongly incentivize many
European banks to avoid, or reduce substantially, their market-making and
underwriting activities for such bonds at least when involving a U.S. nexus prohibited
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massive pool of potential traders.64 Their departure could cause
sovereign debt to become less liquid and more expensive to hold, which
could further impede foreign governments’ ability to raise capital.65 Of
course, these banks could claim that their trading in foreign debt falls
within one of the Volcker Rule’s permitted activity exceptions, such as
market-making; however, any trading in a covered security exposes a
bank to expensive and burdensome reporting requirements.66
U.S. banks may discontinue performing basic market functions in
sovereign debt markets because the Volcker Rule applies to U.S. banks
abroad, thereby threatening the functions they perform in trading
sovereign debt overseas.67 Notably, U.S. banks are often active marketmakers in foreign debt markets, “serving as primary dealers, in several
key non-U.S. government securities markets around the world.”68 The
Bank of Canada stated that if U.S. banks do not participate in foreign
government debt offerings, it would restrict competition and liquidity
“and ultimately undermine the resilience of the Canadian financial
system.”69
Japan’s Financial Services Agency and the Bank of Japan
expressed similar worries, but also stated that the Volcker Rule would
adversely affect the role of Japan’s domestic banks in the Japanese

under the foreign trading exemption. This would not only affect European banks’
earnings situation by reducing their corresponding fee income, but also interfere with
their efficient management of liquidity and funding requirements, for which such
government obligations serve as a major tool.

Letter from Ass’n of German Banks, to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n 7 (Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-4111/s74111-157.pdf.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 7–8.
66. See id. at 7; see also Letter from the Australian Bankers Ass’n, to Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, and Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,
supra note 52, at 5.
67. Letter from Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Canada, to Dr. Ben S. Bernanke,
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 3–4 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-211.pdf.
68. See Hearing on the Impact of the Volcker Rule, supra note 49, at 10.
69. See Letter from Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Canada, to Dr. Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys, supra note 58, at 2.
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sovereign debt market.70 Specifically, they explained that Japanese
domestic banks “might be forced to cease or dramatically reduce their
U.S. operations, and Japanese subsidiaries of U.S. banks may consider
exiting from [trading in Japanese government bonds altogether].”71
Thus, there is a dual threat to sovereign debt markets—the elimination
of the role U.S. banks have in those markets as well as foreign banks
exiting trading in their home country’s debt.
Finally, the comment letters note the unfairness of the Volcker
Rule’s disparate treatment of sovereign debt and U.S. government debt.
Under the Volcker Rule, banks are prohibited from proprietary trading
in sovereign debt but not from U.S. government obligations.72 Public
comment letters stress that this unequal treatment could lead to financial
instability for the U.S. as bond markets become fragmented.73 The
Japan Bankers Association argued that “[d]isequilibrium and unfairness
could cause global financial turbulence, and the destruction of the
supply-demand balance in the bond market could result in an unstable
market environment around the world.”74 On the other hand, there are
arguments against allowing an exemption, most of which are centered
on the riskiness of trading in sovereign debt.
C. ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXEMPTING FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
OBLIGATIONS
Those who oppose an exemption for foreign debt obligations argue
that banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation should
not be allowed to trade in sovereign debt because it is too speculative.
They claim that sovereign debt is risky and cite several examples of
countries that have defaulted, as well as banks that have collapsed from

70. Letter from the Fin. Servs. Agency, Govt. of Japan, and Bank of Japan, to Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, and Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4, supra note 48, at 4.
71. Id.
72. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(A).
73. See, e.g., Letter from Ass’n of German Banks, to Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 54, at 7.
74. Letter from Japanese Bankers Ass’n, to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n 9 (Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-4111/s74111-69.pdf.
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speculating in foreign debt markets. Moreover, opponents argue that
banks already have significant leeway under the current rule because
they are permitted to hold sovereign debt as a long-term banking
investment.75 In addition, banks may also underwrite or make a market
in sovereign debt; the main limitation is that they may not proprietarily
trade sovereign debt for short-term gain. Senators Merkley and Levin,
who had a hand in drafting § 619, say that there is good reason for this.
[F]oreign sovereign debt instruments can be risky instruments. In
the aftermath of the collapse of MF Global, which was reportedly the
result of failed proprietary trades on foreign sovereign debt, and only
15 years after [Long Term Capital Management’s] collapse on
derivative bets on foreign sovereign debt, it is troubling that some
would contend that our financial regulators cannot set limits around
76
such trading by our domestic banks.

Conversely, commentators argue that a comparison with MF
Global is unfair because MF Global did not receive the same prudential
oversight that a federally-insured depository institution receives. As one
comment letter explained, “[t]he lesson of MF Global is not that trading
in government securities is risky, but that trading in any security without
prudential oversight and leverage restrictions is risky.”77
It is clear from the vast number of governments commenting on the
Volcker Rule’s treatment of sovereign debt that there is immense
pressure facing U.S. policymakers to create an exemption. The
comment letters contain a plethora of reasons why the current rule will
negatively impact foreign economies.78 The Agencies, therefore, could
determine that the negative global impact from this financial regulation
poses a risk to U.S. financial stability and that an exemption from
foreign government obligations would “promote and protect the safety
75. Letter from Senators Jeff Merkley and Carl Levin, to Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, and Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 33-34 (Feb. 13,
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-362.pdf.
76. Letter from Senators Jeff Merkley and Carl Levin, to Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, and Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 33 (Feb. 13, 2012),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-362.pdf.
77. Letter from Allen & Overy LLP, to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, and Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 5 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-299.pdf.
78. See supra Part III.B.
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and soundness of the banking entity and the financial stability of the
United States.”79
D. IMPLEMENTING A SOVEREIGN DEBT EXEMPTION AND FUTURE
EXEMPTIONS
The Agencies are able to straightforwardly exempt activities from
the Volcker Rule because § 13(d)(1)(J) does not require any formal
analysis to do so. In contemplating an exemption, the Agencies should
seriously consider that debt markets are a critically important source of
funding for foreign governments and that a rule limiting their use will
hurt foreign economies. Importantly, countries that would be affected
are major trading partners and allies of the U.S.80 Thus, the impact of
their economic turbulence would directly affect the U.S. economy.
Cumulatively, this could endanger the financial stability of the U.S.
In the future, the Agencies will likely only exempt activities when
they feel there is overwhelming political consensus to do so. It would
be unlikely for the Agencies to unanimously agree on an exemption in
any other situation. The sovereign debt controversy is one such scenario
because there is enormous political pressure from U.S. allies to make an
exemption. In addition, by seeking public comment on the use of
§ 13(d)(1)(J), the Agencies are putting more pressure on U.S.
policymakers and gaining additional political backing in support of an
exemption.
Henceforth, the Agencies should use the § 13(d)(1)(J) authority to
minimize the global impact of U.S. financial laws on foreign markets,
particularly when major U.S. trading partners and allies are affected.
While this is a very narrow application, the procedural hurdle in §
13(d)(1)(J) makes any broader exercise unlikely. The Agencies should
consider the interests of other countries who were not consulted during
the legislative process. Similarly, the Agencies should carefully weigh
whether parallel rules implemented by foreign governments would have
a negative impact on U.S. financial stability.

79.
80.

12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(J) (2006).
Governments that have commented on this problem include Germany, Canada,
Japan, Australia, France, Mexico, and the United Kingdom.

